Following the approach suggested by Favero and Rovelli (2002) , I estimate a three-equations system for different sub-samples for Canada. The results indicate that the preferences of the monetary authority have changed between the different regimes. In particular, the parameter associated to the implicit target of inflation has been reduced significantly. The macroeconomic conditions from the side of the aggregate demand have been more favorable than those related to the aggregate supply. The standard deviation of the monetary rule suggests that it has been conducted successfully in the last regime.
Introduction
The literature dedicated to the estimation and analysis of interest-rate rules is very extensive. One of the issues more discussed in this literature is related to the analysis of the behaviour of the parameter associated to the gap between expected and target inflation. When the estimate of this parameter is larger than unity, it is concluded that the monetary policy has been adequate. Representative researches on this aspect are Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 , Judd and Rudebusch (1998) , and Nelson (2003) ; see Hamalainen (2004) for a detailed survey. In order to analyze the behavior of the above mentioned parameter, the estimations have been performed by sub-samples, which have been selected based on prior exogenous criteria.
An interest-rate rule may be observed, following Svensson (1997) , as the result of an optimization of an intertemporal loss function subject to two equations describing the structure of the economy (aggregate demand and supply). In general, the arguments of the loss function are the gap between expected and target inflation, and the output gap. The important issue in this context is that the parameters of the interest-rate rule are convolutions of the original parameters associated to the preferences of the Central Bank and the structure of the economy. Even assuming very simple specifications for the structure of the economy and the loss function, the convolution is complex.
In the above context, as Favero and Rovelli (2002) argue, estimation of an interest-rate rule in a single-equation specification is not a good advise, except if the researcher is only interested in the behaviour of the coefficient associated to the gap between expected and target inflation. The recommendation is the estimation of a three-equations system, allowing for the possibility to retrieve the structural parameters associated to the preferences of the monetary authority and the structure of the economy.
In this paper, I adopt the approach recommended by Favero and Rovelli (2002) using data for Canada for the period 1961:1-2003:3. To the best of my knowledge, no similar approach has been used for this Country. The results show important sensitivities of the smoothing coefficient and the weight assigned to the output gap according to which measure of output gap is used. All estimations indicate that the economic conditions related to the aggregate demand have been favorable in comparison to those related to the aggregate supply. Furthermore, all estimations indicate that the monetary policy has been successful in the last regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 3. Sec-tion 4 concludes.
The Model
I consider the simplest version of the inflation targeting problem as described by Svensson (1997) . Using a similar notation as in Favero (2001) , and Favero and Rovelli (2002) , I assume that monetary authority preferences may be described by the following intertemporal loss function:
where π t is the inflation rate, x t is the output gap, i t is the policy instrument, E t defines the expectations taken with respect to the information available at time t, π * is the target level of inflation, δ is the intertemporal factor of discount, λ is the weight associated to the output stabilization, and µ is the weight attached to interest rate smoothing. Equation (2) may be observed as a general characterization of the policy goals, where special cases such as strict targeting (λ = 0, µ = 0), or flexible inflation targeting (λ = 0, µ = 0) may be considered. When the goal is the specification of an instrument rule, (1) and (2) have to be complemented by specifications of the structure of the economy. Following standard assumptions in the literature, see among others Favero (2001) , and Favero and Rovelli (2002) , I assume the following specifications for the demand and aggregate supply: 3
where u d t+1 and u s t+1 represent shocks to the aggregate demand and supply, respectively. In the empirical section, I use the exchange rate as an additional variable.
In summary, the intertemporal optimization problem is then to minimize (1) and (2) subject to the restrictions (3) and (4) . The coefficients of the obtained monetary rule are convolutions of the parameters associated to the preferences of the central bank (δ, λ, π * ) and the structure of the economy (α π , α x , β r , β x , r). It represents a serious issue in terms of estimating an interest rate rule as a single equation since it implies that the structure of the economy cannot be identified.
I adopt the approach suggested by Favero and Rovelli (2002) , which is based in a three-equations model. This system is obtained by minimizing the loss function (2) under the assumption of finite horizon, and subject to a general distributed lag specification of the aggregate demand and supply from the stylized specifications (3) and (4).
Then, the estimated system , written for j = 1, is the following:
where w t is an additional explanatory variable which is explained in the empirical section. As in Favero and Rovelli (2002) , I use δ = 0.975 because estimation of this parameter is very instable. However, unlike them, I do not impose the restriction that c 6 + c 7 = 1.
Empirical Results
It is worth to note the following issues concerning the estimation of the system (5)- (7): i) the variable w t is the growth rate of the exchange rate; ii) overall, the set of instruments includes four lags of the inflation rate, the output gap, the interest rate, and the growth rate of the exchange rate. However, given that the sample size changes, the set of instruments changes consequently.
Quarterly data is used from 1961:1 to 2002:3. As a measure of the output gap, we have three measures. One measure is obtained after application of the filter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997) . The other two measures are obtained after using a linear and a quadratic trend, respectively. The three measures are denoted by HP, LT and QT, respectively. Annual inflation is measured as 100 × (p t − p t−4 ), where p t denotes logarithms of Consumer Price Index (CPI) 4 . The source of the information for Canada is the Bank of Canada.
The literature on monetary rules has suggested an estimation by subsamples, where the break point is considered exogenous. In a recent paper, Rodríguez (2004) has estimated interest rate rules for Canada and the US using endogenous break points selected by the approach suggested by Perron (1998, 2003) . In general, his results show that the selected break dates are consistent with what previous research has used for the US. I decided to use the same break dates selected by Rodríguez (2004) for Canada.
Two breaks are selected for any measure used in calculating the output gap. When the HP filter is used to calculate the output gap, the breaks are identified at 1980:3 and 1994:2. Using the approaches LT and QT allow to identify 1980:3 and 1995:4 as the break dates. Table 1 shows the estimates. Panel A presents the estimates obtained when the HP filter has been used to calculate the output gap. The estimates of the coefficient π * reflect clearly the evolution of this parameter through the different samples. The value of π * in the third regime is close to the middle point of the target inflation followed by the Bank of Canada. On the other hand, the values for the coefficients µ and λ are difficult to interpret given the opposite sign found in more than one regime. The economic conditions related to the aggregate demand have been favorable in comparison with those related to the aggregate supply 5 . The standard deviation of the monetary rule indicates that the monetary policy has been successful in the third regime in comparison with the other two regimes. In particular, observing this parameter, it seems that the second regime (1980:4-1994:1) has been characterized by a bad conduction of the monetary policy.
Panel B shows the estimates obtained when the LT filter has been used to calculate the output gap. As in the panel A, similar observations are obtained from these estimates. The values of the coefficients µ and λ seem to suggest that reduced smoothing of the interest rates is assigned by the Central Bank and slight weight to the output gap is also attributed.
Panel C, based on estimations using the QT filter to calculate the output gap, show very similar conclusions.
A general conclusion from the estimates is the extreme sensitivity of the estimates to the different approaches in calculating the output gap. It is particularly the cases for the parameters λ and µ. Another conclusion is the fact that preferences of the monetary authorities have changed drastically in last regimes. It is clearly reflected in the estimates of the π * . Better macroeconomic conditions are also observed from the side of the aggregate demand in comparison with those from the aggregate supply. The empirical evidence suggests, without any doubt, the fact that the monetary policy has been conducted efficiently in the last regime.
Conclusions
Estimations of an interest rate rule using single-equation methods has been criticized by Favero and Rovelli (2002) based on the fact that structural parameters, associated to the preferences of the monetary authority and the structure of the economy, cannot be retrieved. This issue of convolution of parameters may be fixed in estimating a three-equations system by GMM as suggested by Favero and Rovelli (2002) . In this paper, I applied this approach for the case of Canada. Estimation by sub-samples was performed using different measures to calculate the output gap.
The results showed important sensitivities of the smoothing coefficient and the weight assigned to the output gap according to which measure of output gap is used. All estimations indicated that the economic conditions related to the aggregate demand have been favorable in comparison to those related to the aggregate supply. Furthermore, all estimations indicated that the monetary policy has been successful in the last regime. It is observed in the value of the π * , which is approximately 2.0%, that is, the middle point of the official target level established by the Bank of Canada. 
